The big question is what Netanyahu’s strategy is now that he has a momentum he has lacked for so long
October 1, 2024 10:13 am(Updated 10:14 am)
Israel’s “limited” ground incursion in southern Lebanon, combined with continued air strikes on targets in Beirut, signify that Israel has now embarked on what may come to be called the third Lebanon war after those in 1982 and 2006.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has rejected the Lebanon ceasefire which US President Joe Biden has repeatedly said he wanted. Instead, the developments overnight raise the question of whether, with the goal he set himself in Gaza of “total victory” still unfulfilled, he has simply embarked on a policy of forever war.
In stark contrast to the bungled intelligence on Hamas’s intentions and lack of military preparedness that preceded the 7 October attack, Israel had already so far scored stunning success, at least in purely intelligence and military terms. First it penetrated and dismantled Hezbollah’s communication network with the exploding pagers. Then it assassinated most of its top leadership, notably including Hassan Nasrallah himself.
This is a severe blow not only to Hezbollah but Iran, which depended on the Lebanese Shi-ite militia as its military vanguard in the Arab world. It’s safe to assume, especially in light of Israel’s massive aerial attack on Hezbollah’s positions and rocket launch pads, that the Israel Defence Forces are better prepared for a possible ground war in south Lebanon than they were in Gaza. And the prospect of more civilian deaths and displacements in Lebanon will not worry Netanyahu any more than the more than 41,000 deaths in Gaza have.
That said, if last night’s incursions are expanded, a full ground war in southern Lebanon will not be a walk in the park. The “violent clashes” – to use the IDF’s term for what happened on and near the border – suggest Hezbollah’s seasoned fighters are still capable of hitting back. Like Hamas in Gaza they have an extensive tunnel network. And no one yet knows after Israel’s aerial attacks how many of its long range rockets – many of which Hezbollah boasted could reach all of Israel – are still usable, with a danger of Israeli civilian casualties.
The big question however is what Netanyahu’s strategy is now that he has a momentum he has lacked for so long. Is it limited to what he has defined as a war goal: to make northern Israel safe enough for the return of the 60,000 residents who were forced to flee after Hezbollah began its rocket attacks in support of Hamas in October? If so, it will not be lost on the families of the 101 hostages still held in Gaza that they are counting for less than the seriously inconvenienced, but not actually endangered, displaced citizens of northern Israel.
Or is he, at the other extreme, seeking to goad Iran into a much bigger conflagration which would almost inevitably drag the United States into a regional war it surely cannot want in the run-up to the November US election?
The US’s own wishes are also not entirely clear. Having called repeatedly for a ceasefire – indeed, one they thought they had secured until Netanyahu reportedly changed his mind on the flight to New York for the UN General Assembly – they were either willing or able to welcome Nasrallah’s assassination, which they say they were not told about before the last minute. Is there anything in the theory that some of Biden’s ceasefire calls are for the benefit for the considerable anti-war elements in the Democrat electorate and that he is more than satisfied to see Iran’s most powerful proxy cut down to size?
But if it is now seriously worried, as it should be, that this could all spiral, it may find that pressure on Iran to contain its reaction may be a better route than applying similar pressure on Israel, which Netanyahu seems to relish ignoring. The military successes so far in Lebanon have largely united Israel in a way that Netanyahu hasn’t tasted since coming into office in December 2022. He is riding much higher than at any time since 7 October. By not going too far he can still no doubt bank his success.
But simply using endless and unlimited fire power which would devastate Lebanon and risk the long threatened regional war could easily come back to haunt him. Wasn’t it the British Prime Minister Robert Walpole who said before the 1739 war on Spain: “They may ring their bells now, before long they will be wringing their hands”?
