As Israeli air strikes began raining down on Lebanon last week, China moved quickly to condemn the latest escalation of fighting in the Middle East.
Meeting his Lebanese counterpart on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged that Beijing would stand “on the side of justice and the side of Arab brothers, including with Lebanon”.
“We pay close attention to the development of the regional situation, especially the recent explosion of communication equipment in Lebanon, and firmly oppose indiscriminate attacks on civilians,” Wang Yi told Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib, according to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Wang’s comments reflected what many observers have come to expect from Beijing in its statements on the Israel-Palestine conflict since the start of the war in Gaza almost a year ago.
From calling for a ceasefire and a “two-state solution” within days of Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel, Beijing has moved steadily closer to explicitly aligning itself with Palestine and the greater Arab world.
At the same time, Chinese state media and officials have been quick to blame the United States for its unwavering support of Israel, though Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described Israel-China ties as a “marriage made in heaven” as recently as 2017, and cast Beijing as an advocate for peace.
Still, even as Chinese diplomats share rhetorical barbs with Israel and the US, Beijing’s actions over the past year have been more symbolic than substantive, analysts say, favouring rhetoric and low-risk policy moves, such as challenging Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories at the International Court of Justice.
China has refrained from taking a hands-on role in the war as countries such as the US, France, Qatar and Egypt – which have been deeply involved in negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict – and has maintained extensive economic ties with Israel despite its increasingly vocal criticism of the country on the global stage.
China’s Embassy in Tel Aviv and mission to Palestine in Ramallah did not respond to requests for comment.
China’s approach to the conflict is in line with how it behaves abroad generally and in the Middle East, in particular, said Hana Elshehaby, a research assistant for the foreign policy and security programme at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha, Qatar.
“China is a high-benefit, low-cost actor in a sense. It will only involve itself to the extent that it’s able to acquire as many benefits as possible, like bolstering its global image, without incurring any costs in the process,” Elshehaby told Al Jazeera. “China is not willing to make any enemies in the region.”
China’s relative caution, however, does not mean that it has nothing to offer the region, according to analysts.
Beijing is a valued player due to its longstanding policy of noninterference, which has translated into a willingness to refrain from criticising the human rights records of many governments in the region, said Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa programme.
“They don’t want China to start intervening in their own domestic affairs,” Aboudouh told Al Jazeera.
China buys oil from opposing governments such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, while also continuing to trade with Israel and invest in its tech sector despite its rhetorical shift towards Palestine.
Beijing has friendly ties with both Turkey and Egypt – which sparred over Ankara’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood before announcing in February that they had turned a “new leaf” in their ties – as well as longstanding competitors Morocco and Algeria.
China’s flexibility helped it broker a surprise diplomatic deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, although much of the groundwork had been laid by Oman, Qatar, and Iraq.
Beijing has also enhanced its economic clout through its Belt and Road Initiative, investing $152.4bn in the Middle East and North Africa between 2013 and 2021, according to an estimate by the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative US think tank.
Even while lacking the influence of the US, which has decades of involvement in the region as a political broker, donor and military power – albeit as a player whose policies have often provoked backlash – China has still managed to make inroads that could potentially help shape Israel-Palestinian relations and the greater Middle East down the road.
Over the past year, China twice brought together 14 Palestinian factions, including rivals Fatah from the occupied West Bank and Hamas from the Gaza Strip, to meet in Beijing.
In July, the factions signed the “Beijing Declaration”, agreeing to work towards “a comprehensive national unity” to establish a bona fide Palestinian state.
The agreement was seen largely as symbolic within the Palestinian territory and overseas, but still earned China some credit, said Gedaliah Afterman, head of the Asia-Israel policy programme at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy in Israel.
“I think it’s too early to say, but I wouldn’t be counting on a very big impact. We know that the tensions between Hamas and Fatah and the other factions go very deep,” Afterman told Al Jazeera.
“But I don’t think that was the point. I don’t think people in Beijing were hoping to really make a huge difference or thought that they could. Rather, it was the beginning of a process and it was a way for Beijing to open a door for their own involvement.”
Hongda Fan, a professor at Shanghai International Studies University, said the view was much the same in China, where officials are aware of their own limitations.
“China’s active promotion of reconciliation among Palestinian factions is commendable, as internal Palestinian consensus is one of the prerequisites for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, it must be admitted that the Beijing Declaration is of little help in resolving the current Gaza-Israel war,” Fan told Al Jazeera.
“The biggest difficulty in ending the Gaza-Israel war now is the lack of an international consensus that is binding on both sides. I think China will continue to work with the international community to reach such a consensus. It is difficult for China to achieve results in the Gaza-Israel war alone,” he added.
Despite these limitations, China has still scored some wins, according to analysts.
China’s support for Palestine is seen to have helped boost its image in the developing world – one of Beijing’s main audiences – while also working to undermine US standing abroad.
“China’s main objective is not to reach long-lasting reconciliation within the Palestinian factions, but rather, it revolves around short-term national interest-related objectives,” Aboudouh said.
Still, while the key players in the Israel-Hamas war are aware that China is largely working to further its self-interest, they can also benefit from its involvement, Aboudouh said.
“The Israelis don’t buy what the Chinese are doing. They don’t take it very seriously. The Gulf countries may share the same perception of China’s true intentions of involvement in this conflict, but at the same time, they see some benefit from that … which can be summed up as more options to hedge their bets in their relations with the US,” he said.
“The Palestinians, on the other hand, see great benefit from China’s approach,” Aboudouh added.
“Hamas, especially, sees China as a conduit for ending its isolation … But they don’t, based on my conversation with Hamas high-ranking officials, believe that this reconciliation effort will actually result in reconciliation with other factions.”
Other non-state actors, such as Yemen’s Houthi rebel group, an ally of Hamas and Iran, have also benefitted from China’s recognition.
Whereas the US has a stated aversion to negotiating with what it calls “terrorist organisations”, Chinese officials can freely meet Houthi representatives – as they did in January to negotiate safe passage for shipping vessels through the Red Sea.
Some analysts believe that with Israel’s war on Gaza devolving into a regional conflict, drawing in other players including Lebanon and Iran, China may move towards a more active role if it feels its interests are at risk.
Besides its economic investments in the region, Beijing has a military base in the East African nation of Djibouti. US media, citing unnamed US officials, have reported that China plans to build a second military base in Oman.
China has also built facilities at several ports across the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to facilitate trade – and, US officials believe, potentially harbour its naval vessels – while Chinese tech companies like Huawei have signed deals to build 5G infrastructure and data centres in both countries.
An escalation in conflict in the region could put all of these projects at risk. A regional war would also threaten China’s energy security, as Beijing sources nearly half of its oil from the Middle East.
“If regional instability doesn’t hurt China too much, and it does hurt the US, then China can accept a certain amount of regional instability. And that’s what we’ve seen so far. But now things are changing a little bit,” said the Abba Eban Institute’s Afterman.
Aboudouh said it is possible that China next publicly engages with Hezbollah.
China’s Wang last week pledged to “support Iran” – a top ally of Hamas and Hezbollah – to “safeguard its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and national dignity”.
Beijing has yet to comment on Iran’s launch of a barrage of ballistic missiles at Israel on Tuesday in response to the assassinations of senior Hezbollah, Hamas and Iranian officials – an attack that has further heightened fears of an all-out regional war.
In the meantime, China has already asked its citizens to leave Lebanon, and this week issued the same advisory for the Chinese nationals in Israel.
“The potential for a serious regional conflict is becoming higher, and in that sense, I think there’s a growing interest for China to play a more calming role in the conflict,” Aboudouh said.
“If there’s a big blow up in the north of Israel with Hezbollah and Iran, then that will impact Chinese regional interests in general, including in the Gulf.”
